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AT THE FRONTIERS OF THE
RUSH FOR BLUE GOLD:
WATER PRIVATIZATION AND
THE HUMAN RIGHT TO WATER
I. INTRODUCTION

W

ater has been called the last frontier of privatization around the
world.1 Public bodies still supply over 90 percent of the world’s
water2 and finance around 90 percent of the developing world’s3 investment in water and sewage systems.4 Yet, by the end of 2000, municipalities in at least ninety-three countries underwent partial privatization of
water or wastewater services, including communist countries such as
China and Cuba.5 Municipalities in still other countries are in the process
of privatizing or evaluating the prospects of private sector involvement.6
Furthermore, international financial institutions such as the World Bank

1. Elizabeth Brubaker, Editorial, A Thirst for Privatization: With More than 1.1
Billion People Worldwide Lacking Access to Safe Drinking Water, Governments Are
Increasingly Turning to the Private Sector for Help, NAT’L POST (Can.), Jan. 9, 2003
(attributing the remark to a journalist of the Financial Times).
2. Private Passions, ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at 6.
3. The terms “developing world” and “developing countries” refer to recipients,
rather than donors, of international aid and assistance. This usage is adopted out of convenience, although it is important to note that the customary distinction between “developed” and “developing” countries is problematic in view of recent rethinking of the term
“development,” such as in the work of the Nobel prize-winning economist, Amartya Sen.
Sen’s approach to development as “a process of expanding the real freedoms that people
enjoy” and, conversely, of “poverty as a deprivation of basic capabilities rather than
merely as lowness of incomes” blurs the customary distinction between “developed” and
“developing countries.” See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 1, 87 (2000). For
instance, Sen points out that although in terms of income African-Americans are many
times richer compared to populations of developing countries, their “capability” to live
long lives is comparatively lower than that of populations in some developing countries.
Id. at 96. I am thankful to Professor Samuel Murumba for pointing me to the work of
Amartya Sen.
4. How Not to Help Those in Need: Third-World Water and the Private Sector,
ECONOMIST, Aug. 28, 2004, at 11, available at 2004 WLNR 10885720.
5. Brubaker, supra note 1 (observing that some form of water privatization took
place in the three countries of North America, twenty-three countries in Latin America
and the Caribbean, twenty countries in Europe, thirty countries in Africa and the Middle
East, and seventeen countries in Asia and the Far East).
6. See, e.g., Gifty Korantemaa, Ghana to Derive Negative Benefits from Water Privatization—Coalition Against Water Privatization, GHANIAN CHRON., Jan. 6, 2006, available at 2006 WLNR 361576 (discussing water privatization in Ghana); Stephen David,
Whose Water is it Anyway?, INDIA TODAY, Dec. 19, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR
19996247 (discussing water privatization in Bangalore, India).

578

BROOK. J. INT’L L.

[Vol. 31:2

have consistently supported privatization, especially in developing countries, often making privatization of utilities a precondition for loans, debt
reprogramming, or loan forgiveness.7
Accompanying the global trend of water privatization, water services
have been consolidated within the hands of a few powerful multinational
companies.8 Each of the two largest water multinationals provides water
services to about 110 million people.9 The combined revenue potential of
multinational water companies measures close to $3 trillion.10
Despite this clear global pattern, privatization of water services has not
gone unopposed. Large protests have attended governments’ attempts to
privatize water in many countries.11 Most famously, community protests
7. A study of World Bank loans between 1996 and November 2002 by the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists reported that the World Bank conditioned
loans on the privatization of water services in about one third of its projects. Center for
Public Integrity, Promoting Privatization, Feb. 3, 2003, http://www.publicintegrity.org/
water/report.aspx?sID=ch&rID=44&aID=45. The study considered 276 long-term investment loans and short-term structural adjustment loans that the Bank had labeled “water supply,” and did not include combined loans. Id. Furthermore, the study also found
that the number of loans conditioned on privatization had tripled in the period after 1996
compared to the period before 1996. Id. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has
supported similar policies. See, e.g., Varsha Gupta D’Souza, Development: IMF’s Chief
New Economist Could Signal Policy Shift, INTER PRESS SERV., July 14, 2003 (remarking
that an IMF loan to Nicaragua required the privatization of water, despite contrary domestic legislation).
8. See Marty Logan, Finance: Corporations Said to Eye Water Privatization in U.S.,
INTER PRESS SERV., Feb. 4, 2003 (noting that while Europe-based multinational companies operated in a mere dozen countries in 1990, they were present in fifty-six countries
and two territories by 2003).
9. The Center for Public Integrity has documented the international presence of the
major multinational water companies, including their former and present subsidiaries. See
generally Center for Public Integrity, The Water Barons, http://www.icij.org/water/
db.aspx?sID=db (last visited Feb. 4, 2006) (noting that Vivendi Environment (now Veolia Environment) operates in over one hundred countries and provides water services to
110 million people, Suez operates in forty-one countries and provides water to 115 million people, while the third largest provider of water services, RWE AG, serves more
than 70 million people worldwide).
10. Logan, supra note 8 (noting also that Vivendi Universal’s revenues from waterrelated services increased from $5 billion in 1990 to $12 billion in 2002). See also Bill
Marsden, Cholera and the Age of the Water Barons, Feb. 3, 2003, http://www.icij.org/
water/report.aspx?sID=ch&rID=44&aID=44 (observing that RWE’s revenues from water
grew “a whopping 9,786 percent,” from $25 million in 1990 to $2.5 billion in 2002).
11. See, e.g., Provinces Protest Proposed Water Law, BUS. NEWS AMERICAS, July 27,
2004 (reporting that farmers and indigenous groups protested privatization proposals by
Ecuador’s government fearing that privatization would endanger local community practices). In Paraguay, protests forced the government to postpone the reinstatement of a
privatization bill, including provisions for the sale of the national water authority, which
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in Cochabamba, Bolivia in 2000 resulted in the “water war,” forcing the
Bolivian government to repeal the water law allowing for privatization,
and to revoke the concession contract with a multinational consortium.12
Furthermore, some governments have rejected water privatization despite
pressure by international financial institutions.13 In another remarkable
development, a 2004 referendum in Uruguay approved a constitutional
reform defining water as a public good and a human right, and ensuring

had been previously repealed in 2002 due to public unrest. Kate Joynes, Paraguayan
Government Concedes to Anti-Privatisation Protesters, WMRC DAILY ANALYSIS, Aug.
20, 2004. In Thailand, a series of protests at a local and international level stalled the
privatization of water in 2004. See, e.g., Labor Unions Launch Nationwide AntiPrivatization Roadshow, FNWEB DAILY NEWS, June 17, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR
7272488 (describing Thailand’s labor unions’ strategy of garnering popular support
against the privatization of state water and electricity utilities); Protest at Thai Embassy
in Brussels over Privatisation; ICEM’s Executive Interrupts Session for Protest, M2
PRESSWIRE, May 27, 2004, available at Westlaw: 5/27/04 M2PW (reporting a demonstration against the Thai government’s privatization plans by 120 trade union leaders from
forty countries in front of the Embassy of Thailand in Belgium); Pravit Rojanaphruk,
10,000 Rally Against Plan to Privatise Utilities, NATION (Thail.), Mar. 28, 2004 (reporting an anti-privatization rally organized by 135 non-governmental and grass-roots organizations, which drew about 10,000 people). Public protests had also accompanied
earlier instances of privatization in Indonesia, Pakistan, India, South Africa, Poland, and
Hungary. See William Finnegan, Leasing the Rain, NEW YORKER, Apr. 8, 2002, at 43, 53.
12. For a comprehensive background on the Cochabamba water war, see generally
Finnegan, supra note 11; JEFFREY ROTHFEDER, EVERY DROP FOR SALE 99–114 (2001). In
the aftermath of the water war, the Bolivian government passed new legislation guaranteeing traditional communal practices and public participation in determining rates, and
prioritizing social needs. Finnegan, supra note 11, at 51. Cochabamba’s water utility was
transferred back into public hands. Id. For a legal discussion of the situation in Cochabamba from a human rights perspective, see Maria McFarland Sánchez-Moreno & Tracy
Higgins, No Recourse: Transnational Corporations and the Protection of Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights in Bolivia, 27 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1663, 1747–89 (2004). For
a legal analysis from the perspective of risk management, see Erik J. Woodhouse, Note,
The “Guerra Del Agua” and the Cochabamba Concession: Social Risk and Foreign
Direct Investment in Public Infrastructure, 39 STAN. J. INT’L L. 295 (2003).
13. See, e.g., María Teresa Ronderos, A Tale of Two Cities, Feb. 11, 2003, http://
www.publicintegrity.org/water/report.aspx?aid=53 (recounting how the city of Bogotá,
Colombia, refused to privatize its utility despite repeated pressure by the World Bank).
The Water and Sewerage Company of Bogotá, Colombia has become “one of the most
efficient, profitable and equitable water utilities in Colombia.” Sarah Garland, Keeping it
Public in Bogota, 38 NACLA REP. ON THE AMERICAS, July 1, 2004, available at 2004
WLNR 11659096. In 2002, the company came out first in ratings by Colombia’s National Planning Commission, ahead of the privatized water utilities, while in 2004, it
received the second highest international credit rating for the second year in a row. Id.
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that its management would remain in public hands.14 Commentators have
said the reform sets a strong political precedent globally for the use of
referenda to protect against privatization.15
The controversy surrounding water privatization reflects different responses to what the international community has recognized as a world
water crisis.16 Over one billion people lack access to safe drinking water,17 while over two billion lack access to adequate sanitation.18 Illnesses
caused by lack of safe water, such as diarrheal diseases, kill over two
million people each year.19 Water conditions have been tied to 60 percent
of the world’s illness.20 Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean
comprise the most severely affected regions.21
14. Raúl Pierri, Uruguay: Referendum Gives Resounding ‘No’ to the Privatisation of
Water, INTER PRESS SERV., Nov. 1, 2004. The referendum took place on October 31,
2004, coinciding with the national election. Id.
15. See id. (quoting from a letter by the environmental group Friends of the Earth,
signed by 127 organizations from 36 countries, which stated that the referendum “sets a
key precedent for the protection of water worldwide, by enshrining these principles into
the national constitution of one country by direct democracy”). Activists in Thailand have
similarly called on the government to organize a referendum to decide the issue of privatization. Labor Unions Launch Nationwide Anti-Privatization Roadshow, supra note 11;
Rojanaphruk, supra note 11.
16. A multi-agency United Nations report referring to the “world water crisis” provides a comprehensive overview of the crisis, its causes and proposed solutions, as well
as a history of international water policies. See generally WORLD WATER ASSESSMENT
PROGRAMME, UNESCO, THE UN WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT: WATER FOR
PEOPLE, WATER FOR LIFE (2003), available at http://www.unesco.org/water/wwap/wwdr/
table_contents.shtml [hereinafter WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT] (asserting that lifestyle
changes, population increases, urbanization, and globalization are contributing factors to
the world water crisis). See also MAUDE BARLOW & TONY CLARKE, BLUE GOLD 3–76
(2002).
17. WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE RIGHT TO WATER 3 (2003), available at http://www.
who.int/water_sanitation_health/rtwrev.pdf [hereinafter THE RIGHT TO WATER].
18. WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 16, at 10.
19. THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 17, at 6. According to quoted data, more children have died from diarrhea in the ten years preceding 2000 than from armed conflict
since the Second World War. Id. at 7.
20. Priceless, ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at 4.
21. The situation is particularly acute in Africa, where up to 40 percent of the population remains with inadequate access to water and sanitation, while only 3 percent of the
continent’s renewable water is put to use, 6 percent of its land is irrigated, and less than 5
percent of its hydropower potential is used. JAMES WINPENNY, WORLD PANEL ON
FINANCING WATER INFRASTRUCTURE, FINANCING WATER FOR ALL 5 (2003) [hereinafter
CAMDESSUS REPORT, after Michel Camdessus, former managing director of the IMF, who
chaired the panel]. In Asia, 19 percent of the population remains without water, and 52
percent without sanitation, while in Latin America and the Caribbean the respective figures are 15 percent and 22 percent. Id.
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The international community has determined to combat the water crisis
at the global level. In the United Nations Millennium Declaration, the
General Assembly vowed “to halve the proportion of people who are
unable to reach or to afford safe drinking water” by 2015.22 At the Johannesburg World Summit in 2002, the world community further agreed
to reduce by half the proportion of people without access to basic sanitation.23 Progress toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals
has varied.24 In part, this is due to the increase of the world’s population,
which offsets the increasing number of people who have obtained access
to water.25 According to some estimates, reaching the Millennium Goals
by the target date would require increasing investments from the current
$30 billion to $75 billion to cover the costs of providing universal access
to water.26 The United Nation estimated in 2002 that Asia, Latin America, and Africa should not expect universal access to safe drinking water
before 2025, 2040, and 2050 respectively, at then-current rates of investment.27
Against this backdrop, proponents of privatization look to private sector involvement as a way to improve water access and sanitation, espe22. United Nations Millennium Declaration, G.A. Res. 55/2, para. 19, U.N. GAOR,
55th Sess., 8th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000). In addition, the Millennium Declaration resolved to “stop the unsustainable exploitation of water resources
by developing water management strategies at the regional, national and local levels,
which promote both equitable access and adequate supplies.” Id. para. 23.
23. World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, S. Afr., Aug. 26–
Sept. 4, 2002, Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development,
para. 8, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.199/20.
24. See UN MILLENNIUM PROJECT, INVESTING IN DEVELOPMENT: A PRACTICAL PLAN
TO ACHIEVE THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS 3 (2005), available at
http://www.unmillenniumproject.org/reports/index_overview.htm. For example, the target of halving the proportion of people without clean drinking water in urban areas has
been met in most regions, except for Eastern Asia. On the other hand, with respect to
rural areas, the progress toward achieving the target is lagging in Sub-Saharan Africa,
Eastern, South-Eastern and Western Asia, as well as in Latin America and the Carribean.
Id.
25. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at 5 (observing that, because of population growth, coverage for urban water has decreased despite the fact that, during the
1990s, 800 million people obtained access to water and 750 million to sanitation).
26. Brubaker, supra note 1 (noting that although estimates tend to vary, they usually
surpass current or planned public spending). A report completed in 2000 under the auspices of the World Water Council and the Global Water Partnership estimated that in
poor countries, about $75–80 billion were invested in water annually, an amount that
would have to be raised to $180 billion to reach the Millennium Goals. Priceless, supra
note 20.
27. A Few Green Shoots—The World Summit in Johannesburg, ECONOMIST, Aug. 31,
2002, at 65.
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cially in cash-strapped less developed countries.28 Opponents contend
that water governance should not be left to market forces.29 They argue
that water is a human right and should remain under the control of public
bodies taking into account social fairness and environmental sustainability.30
Taking account of this debate, this Note examines the nascent developments of human rights law regarding corporate accountability for human rights and the human right to water. While the Note starts from the
premise that water is a human right, it also proceeds from the descriptive
proposition that water privatization is, for better or worse, a global reality.31 The Note proposes that corporate accountability for the human right
28. See WORLD BANK, WATER—A PRIORITY FOR RESPONSIBLE GROWTH AND
POVERTY REDUCTION: AN AGENDA FOR INVESTMENT AND POLICY CHANGE 2 (2003),
available at http://www.wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/
04/25/000094946_03041604014623/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf. Delivered at the
Third World Water Forum in Kyoto, the working paper notes, among other things, the
importance of “exploring public-private partnership options to attract the required increase in financial resources devoted to water investments,” under the rubric “the need
for a new global deal on water.” Id. See also Marwaan Macan-Markar, World Bank
Backs Privatizing Water, Critics Dismayed, INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 17, 2003. The
European Commission has also urged “partnerships between public, private and civil
society actors.” See Commission of the European Communities, Communication on the
Future Development of the EU Water Initiative and the Modalities for the Establishment
of a Water Facility for ACP Countries, at 7, COM(2004) 43 final (Jan. 26, 2004),
available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/dpi/cnc/doc/2004/com2004_0043en01.doc
[hereinafter European Commission Communication]. The communication states that such
promotion must ensure “that those partnerships remain equitable and transparent, allow
free and reversible choices on water services management, safeguard consumers’ and
investors’ interests, and maintain high standards of environmental protection.” Id. In
addition, the communication specifically affirms that the European Community “is taking
a neutral stance on the ownership of public utilities.” Id. A subsequent portion of the
communication, however, speaks of the need for “better mechanisms to use development
aid to leverage other resources (private, development banks, financial institutions, users’
contributions, remittances, etc).” Id. at 11. According to activists, such use of aid subsidizes the privatization of water management. See Stefania Bianchi, Development-EU:
Civil Groups Fear More Water Privatization, INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 17, 2004, available at Westlaw: 3/17/04 INTERPS.
29. Mario Osava, South Could Become Scenario of Water Wars, INTER PRESS SERV.,
Mar. 21, 2003 (setting forth the positions of the organizers of the World Social Forum, an
alternative gathering designed to compete with the World Water Forum, which some
activists see as forwarding a corporate agenda).
30. Id. It is important to note, however, that although opponents of water privatization
invariably cite that water is a human right, not all human rights proponents oppose water
privatization. See infra Part V.A and notes 204–05.
31. This Note does not examine other corollaries of the global trend of water privatization and commodification of water, such as the impact of the international trade regime

2006]

WATER PRIVATIZATION

583

to water may assuage the problems raised by water privatization, without
dispensing with privatization per se. This challenge is twofold to the extent that both corporate liability for human rights violations and the human right to water are relatively recent and still contested notions. Taking up these developments, the Note contends that, especially where host
governments may be weak, corrupt, or otherwise unable to regulate private water providers, it is of utmost importance that multinational water
companies are bound by a duty to the local populations they serve.
Part II describes the global trend to privatize water, theories underpinning this trend, and critiques. Part III expounds the legal basis and the
scope of the human right to water. Part IV sets forth the current developments in theories of corporate accountability for international human
rights violations. Part V analyzes in greater detail the scope of the human
rights liability of private water providers for the human right to water and
defends its desirability, while also setting forth objections and potential
difficulties in enforcement.
II. WATER PRIVATIZATION: HISTORY, JUSTIFICATIONS, AND CRITIQUES
A. Water Privatization in a Historical Context
During the 1970s and 1980s, the principal source of funding water infrastructure in the developing world came in the form of aid by international development agencies, international financial institutions such as
the World Bank, and government agencies such as the U.S. Agency for
International Development.32 Privatized water systems in the 1980s were
the rare exception rather than the rule, and international funding was directed entirely at public entities until 1990.33 In 1989, the sale of water
utilities in Great Britain by the government of Margaret Thatcher34 set
off the global trend of privatization of water utilities.35
and the World Trade Organization. For an extended discussion of potential developments
in this direction, see Rona Nardone, Note, Like Oil and Water: The WTO and the World’s
Water Resources, 19 CONN. J. INT’L L. 183 (2003).
32. Thomas M. Kerr, Supplying Water Infrastructure to Developing Countries via
Private Sector Project Financing, 8 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 91 (1995).
33. According to the Camdessus Report, private water systems operated only in
France, parts of Francophone Africa, areas in Great Britain, a few cities in Spain, and
some distribution schemes in the United States. CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at 7.
34. The government of Margaret Thatcher listed all ten English and Welsh water
utilities on the market. See Private Passions, supra note 2. The total transfer of assets to
private entities has become known as the “British model” of water privatization. Id. For a
commentary on the British lessons of water privatization, see Stagnant—Britain’s Stagnant Water Industry, ECONOMIST, Aug. 2, 2003, at 54. See also Nardone, supra note 31,
at 192 (noting that the primary advantage of assets sale is that it increases the availability
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Few other countries, however, have followed the British model,36
adopting instead a variety of public-private combinations.37 The so-called
French model38 consists of various concession arrangements under which
different portions of the water system, such as operation and management, are granted to private entities on a long-term basis.39 Public water
corporations with private and public shareholders (with the latter usually
being the majority) exemplify a third model of privatization, which some
have extolled as successfully combining private shareholders’ efficiency
goals with public shareholders’ goals of equitable access and affordability.40 Finally, under a fourth model, the government contracts out operation and management to private bidders in a competitive bidding
process.41
of capital that can be put to alternative uses, but that regulation and public protection may
be lacking).
35. CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at 7.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Patricia Grogg, Cuba: Havana Improves Water Supply with Spanish
Investment, INTER PRESS SERV., Feb. 26, 2003. Cuba has retained ownership of assets in
public hands. Id. The Cuban-Spanish company Aquas de la Habana started upgrading
Havana’s water system in 2000, and now runs the piped water, drainage, and sewer services in multiple districts of Havana. Id.
38. This model known as “affermage” originated in the nineteenth century, with the
establishment of Generale des Eaux, now owned by Veolia, by Napoleon III in 1852, and
the establishment of Lyonnaise des Eaux, now owned by Suez, in 1880. See Savoir Faire,
ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at 7.
39. See Nardone, supra note 31, at 191. For instance, the Build-Operate-Transfer
model (BOT), as its name suggests, allows a private company to build and operate a particular project for a certain time period, after which it will transfer ownership to the host
country. See generally Kerr, supra note 32 (arguing in support of the BOT model for
funding water infrastructure in developing countries). The prime advantage of this model
is that cash-strapped governments in developing countries do not have to tap into their
scarce budgets for funding or taking out loans. Id. at 92–93. This model envisions an
important role for international financial institutions, ranging from risk insurance to debt
or equity assistance. Id. at 95–96. Indeed, the heads of Suez and Veolia have favored the
public-private partnership of the French model. Savoir Faire, supra note 38. However,
the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, Miloon Kothari, has
pointed out that a French official audit report discredited this model in 1997. Miloon
Kothari, Privatizing Human Rights—The Impact of Globalisation on Access to Adequate
Housing, Water and Sanitation, n.10 (2003), http://socialwatch.org/en/informes
Tematicos/66.html. The model’s major shortcomings were corruption, lack of transparency, lack of competition, and the concentration of immense power within the hands of
conglomerates at the expense of elected public officials. Id.
40. Nardone, supra note 31, at 191.
41. See id. See also Robert Glennon, Water Scarcity, Marketing, and Privatization, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1873, 1892 (2005) (noting that this is the least controversial form of privatization). Glennon also mentions a fifth possibility of giving private companies ownership
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In the mid-1990s, the domestic public sector accounted for up to 70
percent of investment in water and sanitation.42 Participation by the domestic private sector comprised a mere 5 percent, while international
private companies and international donations accounted for between 10
and 15 percent each.43 In a parallel development, by the late-1990s, international aid for water and sanitation had fallen slightly compared to
aid in the mid-1990s, while aid for irrigation, drainage, and hydropower
had declined substantially.44 The World Panel on Financing Water Infrastructure has described the peaks and drops of private investment and
bank lending in water and sanitation as part of the general decline in financial currents since the mid-1990s.45 However, the remaining factors
accounting for the decline in water investment stem from risks specific to
the water sector.46
Following the economic crises in Argentina and other countries, the
trend to private operation had “come to a virtual stand-still.”47 The newest trend is to combine the expertise and management skills of private
companies with other bodies, with the private company having a small
equity stake.48 Recent reports warn that companies increasingly divest
from developing countries and look to the American market instead because of high investment risks and significant losses that some multinational water companies suffered during the economic collapses in developing countries.49
In view of these developments, international financial institutions have
increased their calls for privatization. A 2003 World Bank paper called
for more private sector involvement in water.50 A declaration by minisof water itself and observes that this form of privatization raises a number of problems,
ranging from the danger of unequal distribution between rich and poor, to lack of transparency and public participation. Id. at 1893.
42. CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at 6.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 7 (noting that in 1996–1998 international aid for water and sanitation
amounted to $3.5 billion, while in 1999–2001, the figure declined to $3.1 billion).
45. Id.
46. According to experts, investment in water infrastructure is more capital intensive
than any other infrastructure project, and in particular twice as high as investments in
natural gas, and 70 percent higher than investments in electricity and telecommunications. Id. at 10. In addition, the water sector yields the lowest financial rates of return than
any other sector. Id. at 11.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Private Passions, supra note 2.
49. Logan, supra note 8. A January 2003 report by Public Services International
stated that Suez was planning to divest a third of its water services in developing countries following the Asian currency collapse in the 1990s. Id.
50. WORLD BANK, supra note 28, at 2.
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ters adopted at the Third World Water Forum in Kyoto in March 2003
also focused on the concept of “public-private partnership” to ensure safe
water and provide revenue for better water sanitation, environmental protections, and irrigation systems.51 In January 2004, a proposal by the
European Commission to allocate $1.2 billion to improve water access
and sanitation of a block of countries in Africa, the Caribbean, and the
Pacific, called for the adoption of innovative solutions, including expansion of private sector involvement.52
B. The Case for Water Privatization
The global trend of water privatization has been explained in part as a
result of “sheer, desperate need” of developing countries for investment
in water.53 Another contributing factor is the global support of international financial institutions and political bodies.54 To understand its appeal, however, it is necessary to delve into the failures of prior models of
international aid to public entities prevalent until the early-1990s.
The funding needs of the water sector have consistently outstripped
available aid, constituting a major setback of the international aid model
prevalent before the 1990s.55 In addition, multilateral aid programs have
suffered from inattention to local input by affected residents, have financed projects that have been both environmentally and economically
unsustainable, and have failed to help the world’s poorest countries.56
Bilateral aid programs have been critiqued for adversely affecting competition, and hence quality of services, by tying aid to specific goods and
services from designated countries.57

51. See Third World Water Forum, Mar. 22–23, 2003, Kyoto, Japan, Ministerial Declaration—Message from the Lake Biwa and Yodo River Basin, para. 6 (Mar. 23, 2003),
http://www.world.water-forum3.com/jp/mc/md_final.pdf [hereinafter Ministerial Declaration].
52. European Commission Communication, supra note 28, at 11. The proposal explicitly incorporates the findings of the Camdessus Report. See id. Critics have expressed
fears that the proposal is more about protecting corporate welfare than the people of the
world’s poorest nations. See Julio Godoy, Analysis, Politics—G8: Activists Fear Summit
Agenda Could be Hijacked, INTER PRESS SERV., May 28, 2003.
53. Brubaker, supra note 1 (noting also that developed countries are attracted to the
private sector as well, despite the fact that they have more resources available, because
reliance on the private sector frees up funds for alternative uses, moves risks away, and
reduces costs due to the private sector’s greater efficiency).
54. See supra notes 7 and 28 and accompanying text.
55. See Kerr, supra note 32, at 94.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 95.
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Furthermore, defenders of privatization point out that public utilities
have largely failed to provide water access to those who most need it,
namely the poor.58 This failure has been tied to a host of factors ranging
from corruption, inefficiency, and lack of investments, to frequent leakages of old infrastructures.59 Public management of water has also been
criticized for grossly underpricing water, with most of the de facto subsidies in developing countries accruing to the middle classes who have
access to piped water,60 leaving poor residents at the mercy of private
vendors who charge as much as ten times higher.61 The opportunity cost
on time spent to obtain water comprises an additional burden on the
poor.62
Proponents of privatization argue from a market perspective that private sector involvement increases efficiency, attracts more finance, and
thus helps build new and much needed infrastructure, especially in developing countries.63 Perhaps most importantly, privatization depoliticizes the regulation of water and allows for a better reflection of costs in
prices, since governments can shift the responsibility for pricing onto the
private sector.64 Proper pricing is critical because it encourages sustainable use of water.65 According to a World Bank senior executive, “water
pricing is an essential instrument to enhance the sustainability of the resource.”66 A further advantage of private sector involvement and the
proper pricing that comes with it is that lenders are more willing to fi58. See Bogged Down—The Private Sector’s Role in Water Supply, ECONOMIST, Mar.
22, 2003, at 15.
59. Id.
60. See Sheila M. Olmstead, What’s Price Got to Do with It?, ENV’T, Dec. 1, 2003, at
22 (noting that in many instances subsidies end up being misdirected both because they
benefit wealthier residents already connected to the water network, but also because subsidies supported by taxes impose a heavier burden on low-income households).
61. Bogged Down—The Private Sector’s Role in Water Supply, supra note 58. See
also To Market, to Market, ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at 16.
62. Olmstead, supra note 60.
63. Brubaker, supra note 1 (contending that the private sector “enjoys greater latitude
to pursue efficiencies” because of market discipline, better expertise, economies of scale,
and its freedom from social goals such as creation of jobs, which in the author’s view
hinder productivity); Kerr, supra note 32, at 92–93. See also CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra
note 21, at 32.
64. Brubaker, supra note 1.
65. See CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at 18 (arguing that “full cost recovery
from users is the ideal long-term aim”). See also Priceless, supra note 20 (noting that
water has been “colossally underpriced,” which leads to its overuse and misuse, and contending that these problems would be best corrected by sensible pricing, which should
reflect costs, including environmental ones).
66. Macan-Markar, supra note 28.
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nance water projects without requiring large equity at the outset by focusing instead on expected revenue for repayment.67
Despite the fact that proponents of privatization highlight cost recovery, many concede that water is more than a mere commodity.68 Because
water is so essential, proponents of private-sector involvement acknowledge that pricing has to take into account such social factors as the inability of poor residents to pay.69 The World Panel on Financing Water
Infrastructure has coined the concept of “sustainable cost recovery”
which embraces the goal of full cost recovery in the long term, while
supporting targeted “pro-poor” subsidies in the meantime.70 Finally, even
in the case of full privatization of assets, commentators have pointed out
that privatization is in fact a misnomer, considering the heavy governmental regulation ranging from tariffs to limitations on the use of assets
such as sewers and public stations.71 As one commentator has put it, “the
choice is really between regulated public monopolies and regulated private monopolies, not between upstanding private service institutions and
profiteering capitalists.”72
C. The Case Against Water Privatization
Opponents of privatization frequently cite the mixed, and in some
cases dismal record of private companies in developing countries.73 One
67. Kerr, supra note 32, at 92–93.
68. See, e.g., CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at vii (“[A]ccess to water is a right
and a basic need.”). A Suez official had even said that “water is too essential to life to be
a commodity,” and that “it is absolutely irresponsible to privatise in developing countries,” prompting comments that he “sounds like an anti-market activist.” A Few Green
Shoots, supra note 27. See also Marwaan Macan-Markar, Cambodia: At last, Tap Water,
Tap Water Everywhere, INTER PRESS SERV., Feb. 18, 2003 (quoting the chief financial
officer of Manila Water, one of the two private companies supplying water to Manila, as
saying that “governments must not give up holding the right to water” and that companies
“are only leasing it”).
69. See To Market, to Market, supra note 61 (pointing to the Chilean government’s
policy of charging full prices for water, but giving stamps to poor residents to pay their
bills, and to the South African policy of providing a minimum supply of water for free).
See also Olmstead, supra note 60 (arguing that uniform tariffs with rebates for lowincome households are best suited to meet distributional goals).
70. CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at 18–19.
71. Private Passions, supra note 2.
72. Olmstead, supra note 60 (adding that the key issue is regulation).
73. The Center for Public Integrity has published a series of reports discussing developing countries’ experiences with water privatization. See, e.g., Andreas Harsono, Water
and Politics in the Fall of Suharto, Feb. 10, 2003, http://www.publicintegrity.org/
water/report.aspx?aid=52 (discussing at length the process of privatization in Jakarta,
Indonesia under the Suharto dictatorship, backed by the World Bank, and noting that the
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study based on a year-long investigation in various countries concluded
that multinational companies in the water business constantly push for
higher prices, frequently fail to meet their commitments, and will abandon the project if returns are too low.74 Privatizing water is likely to reduce access to clean water because of rate increases.75 Making people
pay the full cost of water has in one instance directly caused a cholera
epidemic infecting more than 250,000 people and killing nearly 300.76 In
the Philippines, for instance, five years after the privatization of Manila’s
water system in 1997,77 residents still complained that the price of water
kept going up even under the supposedly more efficient system.78 Aside
from rate increases, observers also cite the concessionaires’ failures to
meet their contractually-set service targets.79 According to commentacompanies’ record of providing water access to the poor and improving finances was
mixed); Daniel Santoro, The ‘Aguas’ Tango: Cashing in on Buenos Aires’ Privatization,
Feb. 6, 2003, http://www.publicintegrity.org/water/report.aspx?aid=50#.
74. Logan, supra note 8.
75. See Grogg, supra note 37. But cf. CAMDESSUS REPORT, supra note 21, at 7 (observing that it is public authorities, and not private multinationals, that supply the underserved regions comprising the 1.1 billion people who still lack access to water, and the
2.4 billion who lack sanitation).
76. See, e.g., Jacques Pauw, Metered to Death: How a Water Experiment Caused
Riots and a Cholera Epidemic, Feb. 5, 2003, http://www.publicintegrity.org/water/report.
aspx?aid=49. The total cost recovery principle adopted in South Africa has led to ten
million South Africans having their access to water cut off for various periods between
1994 and 2002, while two million had been evicted from their homes because of not being able to pay their utility bills. Id. According to South Africa’s Human Sciences Research Council, the cutoffs forced poor people to obtain water from polluted streams and
rivers, directly causing an outbreak of cholera. Id. See also Logan, supra note 8. Cf.
Soweto Residents Protest Against Water Meters, S. AFR. PRESS ASS’N, Sept. 15, 2004
(recounting reports of people refraining from flushing their toilets until they had been
used several times, and storing dirty water for flushing, because the government’s free
allocation of the first 6000 liters was insufficient).
77. The Philippine government privatized the publicly owned Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System in 1997, at the advice of the World Bank. Marites Sison,
Philippines: Awash in Water Bills After Privatization, INTER PRESS SERV., Jan. 22, 2003.
Manila Water, a partnership between the International Water Consortium and a Philippine oligarch family was awarded the concession for the East Zone area, while Maynilad
Water Services, a partnership between Lyonnaise des Eaux and another Philippine family
runs the West Zone area. Id.
78. Macan-Markar, supra note 68. Manila residents served by Maynilad were paying
30 cents per cubic meter of water in 2002, which constitutes a 76 percent increase from
the pre-privatization price four years earlier. Sison, supra note 77.
79. In 2002, Maynilad terminated its 25-year concession after the government failed
to approve further rate increases. Diana Mendoza, Politics: Water Woes of Poor a Key
Issue in Pilipino Election, INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 26, 2004, available at Westlaw:
3/26/04 INTERPS. In 2004, the Philippine government agreed to cancel $142 million of
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tors, the Philippine experience with water privatization shows that privatization does not automatically improve efficiency, and disregards the
economic and social costs to citizens in favor of generating profits and
cost-recovery for multinational water companies.80
Critics also highlight the power disparity between developing countries
and powerful multinational companies.81 Multinational companies are
protected by multilateral trade agreements from termination of their contracts and may seek compensation.82 The costs of compensation would be
prohibitively expensive for governments seeking to terminate contracts
detrimental to the needs of their citizenry.83 On the other hand, companies may often coerce governments into renegotiating contracts because
contract cancellation adversely affects countries’ abilities to attract foreign investment.84 The power disparity between multinational water
companies and the governments of developing countries often results in
closed-door negotiations with little input by citizens, which has been
seen as contributing to a climate of corruption and bribery.85 In some

unpaid concession fees and to convert them into government-held shares, which
prompted opponents in the presidential campaign to call the government action a “bailout” and a “scandalous deal.” Id.
80. Sison, supra note 77.
81. See Kothari, supra note 39.
82. See id. For example, Aguas del Tunari, the concessionaire in Cochabamba, Bolivia brought a proceeding against Bolivia before the International Centre for Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID), and invoked a bilateral investment treaty between the
Netherlands and Bolivia as the basis for jurisdiction. Aguas del Tunari v. Republic of
Bol., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction,
para. 4 (Oct. 21, 2005), http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/cases/AdT_Decision-en.pdf. The
arbitration tribunal rejected Bolivia’s objections to jurisdiction, with one dissent. Id.
paras. 334–37. No decision on the merits had been reached before the publication of this
Note.
83. Kothari, supra note 39.
84. For example, the two multinational concessionaires providing water in Manila
asked the Philippine government in 2001 to amend their contracts to allow them to set
rates without going through the state regulatory agency, and to lower or postpone their
performance targets. Sison, supra note 77. According to one NGO spokesman commenting on the situation in the Philippines, “street-smart companies [may be] making unrealistic and unsustainable bids just to win the tender, and gambling on the possibility that the
rules of the game could change later in their favor, given the weakness of regulation in
the country . . . .” Id.
85. Kothari, supra note 39 (noting that negotiations behind closed doors have encouraged bribery and pointing to the convictions of Suez and Vivendi in France for paying
bribes to obtain water concessions). See also Sylvestre Tetchiada, Development—
Cameroon: Water Projects Plagued by Corruption, May 18, 2004, available at Westlaw:
5/18/04 INTERPS (recounting accusations against Cameroonian officials for demanding
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instances, multinational companies have also cooperated with authoritarian regimes.86
In light of the problems plaguing privatization, opponents have called
on the international community to put its resources into reforming the
public sector of developing countries. Activists argue that international
assistance confers de facto subsidies to private companies,87 and point
out that in many cases water companies invest very little of their own
capital,88 relying instead on loans from the World Bank and other financial institutions.89 For instance, transnational civil society groups commenting on the EU proposal for improving water access and sanitation in
underdeveloped countries critiqued the proposal for assuming, without
evidence, “that the role of the private water industry needs to be expanded.”90
Instead, these groups have called on the European Union to use its
funds to strengthen management skills in the public sector in poor countries, and to help upgrade publicly-run water.91 Under this view, public
management fosters local and community-based participatory decisionmaking. Community participation is better suited to respond to local
needs than big privatization agendas, which force-feed the same policies
on developing nations.92 Some have also pointed to the successes of water delivery run by public bodies.93 The public water system in Phnom
Phen, Cambodia has increased tap-water delivery from 25 percent of

payoffs in connection with a project to supply water to the Cameroonian capital,
Yaounde).
86. See, e.g., Harsono, supra note 73 (discussing the relationships between the Suharto regime in Indonesia and the global multinationals Thames and Suez, which obtained concessions without public bidding). See also John Burton, Malaysia to Spend
Dollars 13bn on Overhaul of Water, Sewage Services, FIN. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 9779449 (reporting on possible renegotiations of concessions
granted to multinational companies under the regime of Mahatir Mohamad behind closed
doors and without competitive bidding).
87. See Bianchi, supra note 28.
88. Logan, supra note 8.
89. See, e.g., Santoro, supra note 73 (observing that Aguas Argentinas obtained at
least 75 percent of its investment in Buenos Aires’s water system from the World Bank
and similar international financial institutions).
90. Bianchi, supra note 28.
91. Id.
92. See Marwaan Macan-Markar, Declaration on Water Lacks Clear Programme of
Action, INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 23, 2003.
93. See Kothari, supra note 39 (asserting that public enterprises operate “some of the
best practices found in water and sanitation provision”).
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homes in 1993, to 80 percent by the end of 2002.94 Similarly, Bogotá’s
publicly managed Water and Sewage Company has risen out of practical
bankruptcy in 1993 and transformed itself into the most respected utility
in Colombia.95
Critics also contend that market-based arguments about efficiency and
pricing according to the laws of supply and demand are misplaced, in
light of the fact that water is a public good,96 as well as a natural monopoly.97 The concept of markets for water belies the fact that water consumers cannot choose the best or lowest-priced provider amongst
many.98 Pricing of water is principally an administrative decision.99
Finally, from a human rights perspective, the acceleration of privatization has been seen to constitute essentially a privatization of human
rights, including the human right to water.100 Privatization of rights results in their erosion and, in particular, leads to violations of the rights of
94. Macan-Markar, supra note 68 (noting, however, that the city’s poor still paid only
a fraction less than what they used to pay to private vendors). See also Kothari, supra
note 39 (pointing to the successes of public enterprises in São Paulo, Brazil; Debrecen,
Hungary; Lilongwe, Malawi; and Tegucigalpa, Honduras).
95. Ronderos, supra note 13. Bogotá has refused to privatize its utility despite repeated pressure by the World Bank. Id. In eight years, the company reduced by half the
number of households without sanitation, and by 75 percent the number of households
without water. Id.
96. See generally Joseph W. Dellapenna, The Importance of Getting Names Right:
The Myth of Markets for Water, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317 (2000). A
“public good” is characterized by “indivisibility,” which means that it cannot be divided
up so that some consumers would buy more of it, while others would be excluded, and
“publicness,” which means that “it is impossible to keep others from accessing and enjoying the good so long as it is accessible and enjoyable by anyone.” Id. at 330. While Dellapenna concedes that water is not physically indivisible and public in a strict sense, he
argues that it should be treated as such considering its economic and social characteristics. Id. at 331–36.
97. The concept “natural monopoly” has been traced to a 1670 treatise, De Portibus
Maris, in which England’s Lord Chief Justice defended governmental regulation of seaports on the principle that they were “affected with a public interest.” See Joseph P. Tomain, The Persistence of Natural Monopoly, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 242, 243
(2002). Tomain defines “natural monopoly” as the idea that a single supplier will provide
services at a lower cost by realizing economies of scale. Id. at 242. The usual solution to
natural monopolies, however, has been not public ownership, but rather the so-called
“regulatory compact” between the state and a private utility, under which “a monopoly on
service in a particular geographical area . . . is granted to the utility in exchange for a
regime of intensive regulation, including price regulation, quite alien to the free market
. . . .” Id. at 243 (quoting Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168,
1189 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
98. Dellapenna, supra note 96, at 321–23.
99. Id. at 323.
100. Kothari, supra note 39.
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the poor.101 As argued below, holding private water companies liable for
the human right to water may present one avenue for preempting such
violations.
III. WATER AS A HUMAN RIGHT
A. Historical Development of the Human Right to Water
The human right to water has been inferred recently and has since then
been relatively contested. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
does not expressly mention a human right to water.102 The two fundamental human rights treaties, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), also do not explicitly refer to a
right to water.103 The only express references to a right to water in human
rights treaties are in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women,104 and the Convention on the Rights of
the Child.105 International humanitarian law106 also contains specific pro101. Id. (contending that “corporate globalisation, and its clear expression of privatisation of services, is one of the greatest threats to universal access to clean drinking water
and sanitation” because it reduces accountability to the public and undermines services to
the poor by emphasized profits and cost recovery). But see infra notes 204–05 and accompanying text.
102. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]. Neither
was the issue discussed during the Universal Declaration’s drafting. ROTHFEDER, supra
note 12, at 79.
103. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature
Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 6 I.L.M. 360 (1967) (entered
into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR].
104. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women art. 14(2), opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19 I.L.M. 33
(1980) (“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to . . . ensure to [women in
rural areas] the right . . . (h) To enjoy adequate living conditions, particularly in relation
to . . . water supply . . . .”).
105. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 24(2)(c), Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S.
44, 30 I.L.M. 1448 (1989) (requiring state parties “to combat disease and malnutrition . . .
through the provision of adequate nutritious foods and clean-drinking water . . . .”).
106. International humanitarian law refers to the body of law applicable in armed conflict. See generally Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded
and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Convention for
the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Conven-
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visions about the right to water.107 In addition, the human right to water
has been enshrined in several national constitutions.108
In 2002, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ESCR Committee) issued Comment 15 addressing specifically the human right to water.109 In the aftermath of Comment 15, references to the
human right to water appeared in multiple reports of the United Nations
and other entities,110 and in the official remarks of world leaders.111
However, a declaration of government ministers adopted at the Third
World Water Forum in Kyoto in 2003 notably lacked language recognizing the right to water as a human right,112 indicating a lack of international consensus on the issue.113
tion III]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
107. See, e.g., Geneva Convention III, supra note 106, arts. 20, 26 (providing that the
detaining power shall provide sufficient drinking water to prisoners of war).
108. For example, the Constitution of South Africa explicitly recognizes a right to
water:
(1) Everyone has the right to have access to
....
(b) sufficient food and water;
....
(2) The state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these
rights.
S. AFR. CONST. 1996 art. 27. The passing of a constitutional amendment recognizing
water as a human right in Uruguay in 2004 provides another example. See supra note 14
and accompanying text.
109. See generally General Comment No. 15 (2002): The Right to Water (Arts. 11 and
12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), U.N. Comm.
on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rts., 29th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002) [hereinafter
Comment 15].
110. See, e.g., THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 17.
111. For example, at the Third World Water Forum in 2003, French President Jacques
Chirac stated in a video presentation that “water should be recognized as a human right.”
Marwaan Macan-Markar, Egypt Urges Programs Not Promises in Blue Revolution,
INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 16, 2003. See also THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 17, at 6
(quoting remarks by United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan that “access to safe
water is a fundamental human need and, therefore, a basic human right”).
112. See Ministerial Declaration, supra note 51, para. 1 (stating, instead, that “water is
a driving force for sustainable development including environmental integrity, and the
eradication of poverty and hunger, indispensable for human health and welfare”); MacanMarkar, supra note 92. The Ministerial Declaration as well the organizers of the World
Water Forum have been criticized for sidestepping the United Nations, and seeking to
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B. Scope and Legal Basis of the Human Right to Water
Although the ICESCR does not refer explicitly to a right to water, the
ESCR Committee has stated that a right to water is implicit in other
enumerated rights in the ICESCR. Specifically, the ESCR Committee
has declared that the right to water is implicit within the right to an adequate standard of living under article 11(1) of the ICESCR because it
“clearly falls within the category of guarantees essential for securing an
adequate standard of living, particularly since it is one of the most fundamental conditions for survival.”114 Furthermore, the ESCR Committee
has stated that the right to water is “inextricably related” to the right to
the highest attainable standard of health under article 12(1)115 and the
rights to adequate housing and adequate food under article 11(1) of the
ICESCR.116 Finally, the right to water “should be seen in conjunction
with other rights enshrined in the International Bill on Human Rights,
foremost among them the right to life and human dignity.”117 In view of
the aspirational articulation of the guarantees of the ICESCR, grounding
the right to water in this covenant has distinct implications on what kind
of responsibilities are conferred on state and non-state actors.118
Some scholars have pointed to customary international law as a basis
for the right to water.119 According to this argument, states have engaged

bestow international legitimacy on what critics view as a privatization agenda through a
ministerial meeting. See Marwaan Macan-Markar, Critics Accuse Water Forum of Sidestepping U.N., INTER PRESS SERV., Mar. 20, 2003.
113. See ROTHFEDER, supra note 12, at 85–90 (reviewing debates at other international
conferences regarding the question whether water should be viewed as a legal right or a
need).
114. General Comment 15, supra note 109, para. 3.
115. See also THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 17, at 3 (stating that the human right to
the highest attainable standard of health encompasses the “underlying determinants of
health,” including safe water and adequate sanitation).
116. Comment 15, supra note 109, para. 3. The United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Adequate Housing has stated that “without access to potable water the right to adequate
housing loses its meaning.” Kothari, supra note 39.
117. Comment 15, supra note 109, para. 3.
118. Earlier commentators on the right to water writing before Comment 15 have explored the argument that the right to water should be seen as implicit within the right to
life under article 6(1) of the ICCPR. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, A Human Right to Water: Domestic and International Implications, 5 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9–12
(1992).
119. Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1727–28. Cf. McCaffrey, supra
note 118, at 8 (exploring, but ultimately rejecting an argument that a right to water could
be binding as customary law if read into the right to an adequate standard of living under
the Universal Declaration because it is not clear that so-called “welfare rights” under the
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in a consistent practice of ensuring water provision for their citizens.120
Secondly, the numerous world conferences and summits that have recognized water as a human right may be seen as indicating opinio juris, that
is, belief by states that they have a legal obligation to ensure access to
clean and affordable water.121
The right to water, as elaborated in Comment 15, encompasses both
substantive and procedural components. The substantive components
comprise availability, quality, and accessibility, including the principle
that “water, and water facilities and services, must be affordable for
all.”122 The procedural components consist of the right to information
concerning water issues, the right to participate, and the right to effective
remedies.123
Comment 15 provides for general and specific obligations on state parties.124 Notwithstanding article 2(1) of the ICESCR, which provides for a
progressive achievement of rights recognized under the covenant,125 the
ESCR Committee has stated that state parties have some “immediate obligations” in relation to the right of water, “such as the guarantee that the
right will be exercised without discrimination of any kind . . . and the
obligation to take steps . . . toward the full realization of [the rights to an
adequate standard of living and to the highest attainable standard of

Declaration constitute binding customary law). The concept of “welfare” rights is discussed below. See infra Part III.C.
120. Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1728 n.295.
121. Id. The authors recognize, however, the obstacles to this argument evident in such
documents as the Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, Principle
No. 4, which designates that water should be recognized as an economic good. Id.
122. Comment 15, supra note 109, para. 12.
123. Id. para.12(c)(iv) (“[A]ccessibility includes the right to seek, receive and impart
information concerning water issues.”); id. para. 48 (“The right of individuals and groups
to participate in decision-making processes that may affect their exercise of the right to
water must be an integral part of any policy, programme or strategy concerning water.
Individuals and groups should be given full and equal access to information concerning
water . . . held by public authorities or third parties.”); id. para. 55 (“Any persons or
groups who have been denied their right to water should have access to effective judicial
or other appropriate remedies at both national and international levels.”). See also
Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1675.
124. See Comment 15, supra note 109, paras. 17–38.
125. Article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides: “Each state party . . . undertakes to take
steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized . . . by all appropriate means,
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.” ICESCR, supra note 103,
art. 2(1).
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health].”126 Furthermore, Comment 15 provides for a “constant and continuing duty” on states “to move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realization of the right to water.”127 Finally, it introduces a “strong presumption that retrogressive measures taken in relation to the right to water are prohibited . . . .”128
Comment 15 divides the specific obligations of states into three categories. First, “obligations to respect” essentially impose a negative duty
on states to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of the right to
water.129 Second, “obligations to protect” impose affirmative duties on
states to prevent third parties from interfering with the enjoyment of the
right to water.130 Third, “obligations to fulfill” require states to adopt a
variety of measures empowering individuals and groups to exercise their
right to water.131 Finally, Comment 15 introduces the concept of “core
obligations,” which include the obligation to “ensure access to the minimum essential amount of water, that is sufficient and safe for personal
and domestic uses to prevent disease.”132
With respect to non-state actors, states’ obligations to protect encompass safeguards against the actions of corporations operating water facilities.133 In particular, “where water services . . . are operated or controlled
by third parties, States parties must prevent them from compromising
equal, affordable, and physical access to sufficient, safe and acceptable
water.”134 Furthermore, Comment 15 explicitly provides that “arbitrary
or unjustified disconnection from water services or facilities,” and “discriminatory or unaffordable increases in the price of water” constitute
prima facie violations of states’ obligation to respect the right to water.135
These protections are directly relevant to potential violations that might
arise from water privatization. As discussed below, however, safeguarding the human right to water from the potential violations by privatized
water utilities through the mechanism of state responsibility may be in126. Comment 15, supra note 109, para. 17. For an earlier discussion of the legal bases
of a right to water and an argument that the right to water should be “an immediate obligation” of the state party encompassing a positive duty to supply safe water sufficient to
sustain life, see McCaffrey, supra note 118, at 13.
127. Comment 15, supra note 109, para. 18.
128. Id. para. 19.
129. Id. paras. 21–22.
130. Id. paras. 23–24.
131. Id. paras. 25–29 (further dividing the obligations to fulfill into obligations to facilitate, promote and provide).
132. Id. para. 37.
133. Id. paras. 23–24.
134. Id. para. 24.
135. Id. para. 44(a).
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adequate in light of the power differential between multinational water
companies and the governments of developing countries. Governments
of developing countries may be weak, corrupt, or fearful of detracting
foreign investment.136 It is therefore necessary to elaborate and support
the legal mechanisms for holding private water providers directly liable
for infringing the human right to water.
C. Objections to the Right to Water
The right to water and its proper legal basis has aroused some controversy. In the view of two U.S. scholars, Michael J. Dennis and David P.
Stewart, “the derivation of a separate right to water is virtually without
precedent.”137 They see the inference of a right to water from the provisions of the ICESCR as part of a larger revisionist program by the ESCR
Committee.138 In their view, the Committee has unduly rewritten provisions of the ICESCR and expanded the liability of state parties in a way
neither borne out by the text of the covenant, nor by the history of its
negotiation.139
In particular, Dennis and Stewart direct the brunt of their critique at the
pronouncements made by the ESCR Committee concerning the affirmative duties on states to “fulfill” the rights provided for by the ICESCR,
and the idea that states have immediately applicable core obligations—
from which no derogation is permitted—to provide “minimum essential
levels” of the rights to water, housing, food, and health.140 These interpretations of the ICESCR articulate “unmistakably mandatory” obligations that, according to the authors, directly conflict with the aspirational
and progressive nature of state obligations as articulated by article 2(1)
of the ICESCR and evident in the treaty’s negotiating history.141
In addition, Dennis and Stewart object to some of the implementation
procedures provided for by Comment 15, in particular the requirement
that states adopt a national water strategy to be reviewed for compliance
with the ICESCR requirements.142 Subjecting the distribution and priorities of state resources to judicial determination would inappropriately
result in judicial second-guessing of what are essentially legislative deci136. See supra notes 81–86 and accompanying text.
137. See Michael J. Dennis & David P. Stewart, Justiciability of Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights: Should There be an International Complaints Mechanism to Adjudicate
the Rights to Food, Water, Housing, and Health?, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 494 (2004).
138. Id. at 491–500.
139. Id. at 494.
140. Id. at 491–92.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 497.
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sions of sovereign governments.143 Judicial determinations are especially
inappropriate in the context of scarce resources because they would subject governments to liability for mere bad luck.144
This skepticism regarding the legal basis of, inter alia, the right to water and, consequently, its normative content and implementation procedures, stems from the larger jurisprudential and political debates regarding the differences between the so-called “liberty rights” under the
ICCPR, and the so-called “welfare rights” under the ICESCR.145 Liberty
rights have been traditionally understood as negative rights, requiring the
state merely to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of such
rights.146 Welfare rights, on the other hand, require positive state action
and significant expenditure of state resources.147 This dichotomy has
been challenged, however, as misplaced and reflective of the ideology of
the Cold War era.148 A closer examination reveals that liberty rights are
not absolutely dissimilar from welfare rights in two respects. Liberty
rights impose affirmative duties on state parties to organize governmental institutions—such as a legislature and a judiciary—that would ensure
the rights’ realization, which requires spending resources.149 Second, liberty rights have been interpreted to require affirmative steps by states to
ensure the protection of rights from private infringement by third parties.150 Moreover, at a conceptual level, the privileging of negative “liber-

143. Id. at 498 (“Who is to say when a government has spent enough money to ensure
a complaining individual’s highest attainable standard of physical or mental health?”).
144. Id.
145. See id. at 463–64 (“In light of Article 2(1) [of the ICESCR], can it cogently be
argued that the ICESCR articulates real rights, or does it merely set forth hortatory goals,
programmatic objectives, or utopian ideals?”).
146. McCaffrey, supra note 118, at 14–15 (explaining and critiquing this assumption
as misplaced).
147. Id.
148. See Amnesty International, The UN Human Rights Norms for Business: Towards
Legal Accountability, at 10, AI Index 0-86210-350-9 (2004), available at http://web.
amnesty.org/aidoc/aidoc_pdf.nsf/Index/IOR420022004ENGLISH/$File/IOR4200204.pdf
(observing that when the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was elaborated into
treaty form, the two treaties were split as a result of the “ideological divisions of the Cold
War,” and that after the Cold War, “it again became possible to view human rights obligations as interdependent”). Cf. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Does Globalization Advance Human
Rights?, 25 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 125, 135 (1999) (observing that during the 1980s the US
rejected economic, social and cultural rights “in part as an element of larger Cold War
strategies”).
149. McCaffrey, supra note 118, at 15; Dunoff, supra note 148, at 129.
150. Dunoff, supra note 152, at 129.
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ties” over economic needs has been forcefully critiqued by Amartya Sen
as rooted in an unduly narrow concept of freedom and justice.151
Concededly, even if the distinction between liberty and welfare rights
is viewed as untenable, one still has to grapple with a textual difference
in the ICCPR and the ICESCR. Whereas the ICCPR binds state parties to
an “immediate obligation” to respect and ensure the proclaimed rights,152
the ICESCR only obligates a state party to take steps “to the maximum
of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full
realization of the rights recognized in the . . . Covenant . . . .”153 This difference between the ICESCR and the ICCPR lends support to the view
that the ICESCR sought to articulate “aspirational” goals rather than enforceable and justiciable state obligations. Because of their aspirational
nature, the argument goes, economic, social, and cultural rights are difficult to implement through judicial mechanisms.
In response, some have pointed out that some of the rights under the
ICESCR, including the right to water, are so fundamental as to require
immediate, rather than progressive obligations on state parties.154 Furthermore, the inference of immediately applicable core obligations to
provide minimum essential levels of water may be seen as consistent
with the obligation of good faith compliance with treaties.155 Immediate
obligations with respect to the right to water would not be unduly burdensome, insofar as they incorporate a “due diligence”156 standard suffi151. Sen traces the precedence of “liberty” over economic needs to John Rawls’ theory
of justice, and libertarian variants of that theory, as exemplified in the work of Robert
Nozick. See SEN, supra note 3, at 63–67. Instead, Sen proposes a “capability” oriented
approach to justice, which emphasizes a person’s freedom to choose a life she values. Id.
at 74. Sen defines “capability” as “the substantive freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations,” where functioning “reflects the various things a person may value
doing or being,” ranging from basic sustenance to participating in communal life. Id. at
75. Thus, within the capability framework, both “liberty” and economic and social needs
are theoretically accorded equal importance.
152. See ICCPR, supra note 103, art. 2.
153. ICESCR, supra note 103, art. 2(1).
154. See McCaffrey, supra note 118, at 13. See also Comment 15, supra note 109,
para. 1 (stating that the human right to water “is indispensable for leading a life in human
dignity” as well as “a prerequisite for the realization of other human rights”); Amnesty
International, supra note 148, at 10 (“Without protecting basic subsistence rights (such as
food, water or shelter), it is difficult to exercise civil and political rights (such as free
speech, fair trials or electoral participation).”).
155. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 79 (1969).
156. It should be noted that human rights law does not indicate what the standard of
care should be with respect to the right to water. See Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra
note 12, at 1730. It has been argued, however, that strict liability would be undesirable
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ciently elastic to take into account the capabilities of the particular
state.157
With respect to the alleged difficulty of judicial determination of violations of the right to water, it should be attributed to the absence of national or international caselaw, rather than to some inherent nonjusticiability of economic, social, and cultural rights.158 Therefore, empowering the ESCR Committee to hear individual cases would allow it to
elucidate the standard of care applicable to violations of the right to water.159 Furthermore, attention should be focused on the procedural rights
attendant to the right to water because violations of procedural rights
lend themselves more readily to easy identification and monitoring.160
Finally, regarding the argument that judicial adjudication of the human
right to water encroaches on what are essentially legislative decisions
about distribution of state resources, one might argue that Dennis and
Stewart are unduly formalistic. Judicial bodies have always engaged in
the balancing of resources, to the extent that such balancing is implicit in
protecting the minimum of rights that states and legislatures may not
transgress.
IV. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Justification of Corporate Liability for Violations of International
Human Rights
Corporate activities have been brought into the ambit of international
human rights law only recently. Historically, the human rights regime
emerged to protect the rights of individuals from abuse by their governments; therefore, states have the principal duty to enforce international
human rights law.161 Although the development of international criminal
law had focused international attention on the human rights responsibili-

for state acts or omissions that do not give rise to liability under ordinary tort principles
and that a negligence standard would be more appropriate. Id.
157. See McCaffrey, supra note 118, at 13.
158. See Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1672 n.20 (“The lack of national case law directly related to economic, social, and cultural rights has itself perpetuated the idea that those rights are not capable of judicial enforcement.” (quoting
MATTHEW CRAVEN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND
CULTURAL RIGHTS: A PERSPECTIVE ON ITS DEVELOPMENT 10 (1995))).
159. Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1791.
160. Id. at 1794.
161. Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443, 465–66 (2001).
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ties of individual non-state actors, attention to the human rights violations by corporations had remained scant until recently.162
The case for corporate liability for violations of international human
rights remains controversial.163 The omission of private actors from the
purview of international human rights law reflects the broader notion that
only actions by states constitute the proper subject matter of international
law, whereas violations by private actors fall within the purview of domestic laws.164 Holding corporations liable for violations of international
human rights departs from this traditional doctrine. The departure has
been justified on the ground that the increasing economic165 and political
influence of corporations166 in a globalized market requires that corporations comply with human rights.167 Governments, especially those of undeveloped and developing countries, may be reluctant to regulate corporate activities for fear of discouraging foreign investments.168 In addition,
162. David Weissbrodt & Muria Kruger, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 97
AM. J. INT’L L. 901, 901 (2003).
163. See generally Ratner, supra note 161 (describing the jurisprudential debates surrounding corporate liability for human rights, and making the case that corporate liability
is desirable and justified).
164. Id. at 466.
165. In 2000, the production output of transnational corporations amounted to one
fourth of the world’s total output, and 5 percent more of the output of all developing
countries combined. Ann Marie Erb-Leoncavallo, The Road From Seattle, 37 UN
CHRON., Jan. 1, 2000, at 2831. The direct investments of transnational corporations in
developing countries have surpassed official aid and net lending by international banks.
Id.
166. See Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, pmbl., U.N. Sub-Comm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2
(2003) [hereinafter Norms] (noting that global trends have greatly increased the influence
of transnational corporations and that these entities have both “the capacity to foster economic well-being” as well as to “cause harmful impacts on the human rights and lives of
individuals”). See also Amnesty International, Submission by Amnesty International under Decision 2004/116 on the “Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights”, AI Index: POL 34/006/2004,
Sept. 29, 2004, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engpol340062004 (noting that companies exercise “tremendous influence and power” and that government regulation may
be inadequate in many countries to protect individuals from adverse corporate actions).
167. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 162, at 901 (“[W]ith power should come responsibility. . . .” (quoting Mary Robinson, U.N. High Comm’r for Hum. Rts., Second
Global Ethic Lecture: Human Rights, Ethics and Globalisation, University of Tübingen,
Germany (Jan. 21, 2002), http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/special/2002/robinson)).
168. Sean D. Murphy, Taking Multinational Corporate Codes of Conduct to the Next
Level, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 392–93 (2005); Ratner, supra note 161, at 462.
Ratner describes the historical shifts of power between governments and companies as a
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the global operations of corporations in multiple countries have made
them more independent of government control169 and outside the reach of
any single government.170
B. The Evolution of Corporate Responsibility: From Voluntary Codes
Towards Binding Norms
The first initiatives for corporate accountability for international human rights violations consisted of voluntary codes of conduct.171 The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) issued Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (OECD Guidelines) in
1976, applicable to enterprises operating in OECD member countries and
eight non-members.172 The OECD Guidelines provide that enterprises
should “respect the human rights of those affected by their activities consistent with the host government’s international obligations and commitments.”173 Although the OECD Guidelines are not legally enforceable, but rather voluntary and aspirational,174 they do, nevertheless, provide for a monitoring apparatus consisting of National Contact Points set
“swinging pendulum.” In the colonial period, the system of “concessions” vested power
in the colonial metropolises, which supported the exploitation of the colonies by the big
European companies such as British East India. The period of decolonization saw expropriations of foreign investment by newly decolonized states, and the first efforts by host
states to draft a multinational code of conduct for transnational corporations. The emphasis on host state rights gave way, at the end of the Cold War, to yet another shift in favor
of the rights of transnational corporations, manifested in bilateral treaties between home
states and host states, and free trade agreements. Id. at 452–60. For a discussion of the
implications of bilateral investment treaties on state protections of human rights, see
Ryan Suda, The Effect of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Human Rights Enforcement
and Realization (2005), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/workingpapers/documents/GLWP
0105Suda.pdf (last visited Jan. 8, 2006) (noting that expropriation provisions in bilateral
investment treaties may preclude states from regulating human rights, and outlining a
hypothetical human rights defense to an arbitration brought by an investor for alleged
expropriation).
169. Ratner, supra note 161, at 463.
170. See Amnesty International, supra note 148, at 5.
171. One of the earliest and best known voluntary codes of conduct, the “Sullivan
Principles,” was elaborated for transnational corporations operating in South Africa during apartheid. See Sullivan Principles for U.S. Corporations Operating in South Africa,
24 I.L.M. 1496 (1985). For an overview of the various initiatives for developing corporate codes of conduct, including a brief review of the Sullivan Principles, see Murphy,
supra note 168, at 403–20.
172. See Organisation for Economic Co-operation & Development, OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises, June 21, 1976, http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/192
2428.pdf (revised 2000).
173. Id. at 19.
174. Id. at 17.
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up by adhering states and an overseeing Investment Committee.175 The
main critique of the OECD Guidelines concerns their implementation.
Their monitoring mechanism has been viewed as inadequate because its
bodies lack investigative or remedial powers and are susceptible to abuse
because state officials may refrain from actions that would alienate business from the economic interests of their government.176 Secondly, it has
been argued that the human rights provision in the OECD Guidelines is
too general to provide meaningful guidance for companies.177
In January 1999, United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan articulated nine principles for corporate responsibility at the World Economic
Forum.178 With the addition of a tenth principle against corruption in
2004, these principles have come to be known as the Global Compact.179
With respect to human rights, the Global Compact articulates two principles: (1) “Businesses should support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights;” and (2) “make sure that they are
not complicit in human rights abuses.”180 The inclusion of a pledge to
support human rights and to avoid complicity with human rights violations reflects an expansion of the role of business enterprises regarding
human rights over and above that implicit in the OECD Guidelines,
which provided only that business enterprises should “respect” human
rights. Companies may participate in the Global Compact by sending a
letter to the Secretary-General, followed by a change in corporate operations “so that the Global Compact and its principles become part of strategy, culture and day-to-day operations” of the company.181 Still, the
Global Compact has been criticized for being too general, for failing to
encourage companies to consider best practices compliant with the prin-

175. Id. at 32, 35–37.
176. See Amnesty International, supra note 162 (expressing concern that government
officials may be too close to business interests, potentially allowing the government’s
economic interest to influence its consideration of corporate behavior).
177. Id.
178. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Address at the World Economic Forum in Davos,
Switzerland (Jan. 31, 1999), U.N. Doc. SG/SM.6448.
179. The ten principles forming the Global Compact and other initiatives under the
same umbrella are available at United Nations Global Compact, http://www.unglobal
compact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited Jan. 8, 2006).
180. Id.
181. United Nations Global Compact, How to Participate in the Global Compact,
http://www.unglobalcompact.org/HowToParticipate/index.html (last visited Jan. 8,
2006).
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ciples, and for lacking any oversight mechanisms or means to contest the
participation of companies that fail to abide by its principles.182
Responding to increased international scrutiny of corporate activities,
many companies have adopted voluntary internal codes of conduct.183
Although around 1,000 internal company codes have been estimated to
exist,184 according to Amnesty International, fewer than fifty make explicit references to human rights.185 The shortcomings of voluntary
schemes in ensuring that corporations abide by human rights norms have
led to deliberations of binding measures.
C. The Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
In 2003, the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights adopted a landmark instrument of corporate
human rights obligations, the Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard
to Human Rights (Norms).186 The Norms have been written as the first
182. Amnesty International, supra note 166. See Murphy, supra note 168, at 413. It
should be also pointed out that a search of the Global Compact participant database reveals only 889 business participants worldwide. United Nations Global Compact, COP
Search Results, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/CommunicatingProgress/cop_ search.
html?reset=1(click “Business participants only”; then click “Search”) (last visited Jan. 8,
2006).
183. For a discussion of the rise of corporate codes of conduct, see Fiona McLeay,
Corporate Codes of Conduct and the Human Rights Accountability of Transnational
Corporations—A Small Piece of a Large Puzzle (2005), http://www.nyulawglobal.org/
workingpapers/documents/GLWP0105McLeay.pdf. For a discussion of corporate responses to international scrutiny from a legal-sociological standpoint, especially in the
wake of human rights claims against corporate actors under the Alien Torts Claims Act,
see generally Ronen Shamir, Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Torts Claims Act:
On the Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 635
(2004). Shamir argues that companies have responded with a twofold strategy. The first
part of companies’ strategy is to undermine the identity and motives of Western public
interest lawyers who bring the cases, and the second part consists of the adoption of internal voluntary codes. The adoption of voluntary codes allows companies to “stabilize”
the meaning of the concept “social responsibility” around voluntary, rather than binding,
schemes. Id. at 660. As the author puts it, “corporate voluntarism has become . . . a crucial frontline in the struggle over meaning and an essential ideological locus for disseminating the neoliberal logic of altruistic social participation that is to be governed by
goodwill alone.” Id. For an example of a voluntary code of a multinational water company, see RWE, RWE CODE OF CONDUCT, http://www.rwe.com/generator.aspx/property=
Data/id=266710/en-download.pdf.
184. McLeay, supra note 183, at 7.
185. Amnesty International, supra note 148, at 5.
186. See generally Norms, supra note 166.
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non-voluntary scheme for international corporate accountability for human rights abuses.187 Their legal authority has been hotly contested. The
Norms’ principal drafter argues that “[t]he legal authority of the Norms
derives principally from their sources in treaties and customary international law, as a restatement of international legal principles applicable to
companies.”188 Critics have disputed this characterization, charging that
the Norms “are presented as a set of norms or standards when in fact
many of the instruments from which they are drawn are not themselves
legally binding and those that are heavily qualify the rights they are supposed to address.”189 While the Norms have been overwhelmingly supported by international human rights organizations and civil society representatives in numerous countries,190 multiple business associations

187. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 162, at 903. See also Amnesty International,
supra note 148, at 6–7 (noting that the Norms are “self-consciously normative,” and lack
clauses characteristic of voluntary schemes that would highlight their non-regulatory
character). In April 2004, however, the Commission on Human rights issued a decision,
in which it “affirm[ed] that [the Norms] has not been requested by the Commission and,
as a draft proposal, has no legal standing, and that the Sub-Commission should not perform any monitoring function in this regard.” Report of the Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, U.N. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 60th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2004/L.73/Rev.1 (Apr. 16, 2004).
188. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 162, at 913; Amnesty International, supra note
148, at 7 (“All of the substantive human rights provisions in the UN Norms are drawn
from existing international law and standards. The novelty or the UN Norms is to apply
these . . . to private enterprises, but even in doing so to draw on a wide range of international practice . . . .”). See also Norms, supra note 166, pmbl. (recalling that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights is addressed to every organ of society, including transnational corporations and other business enterprises). Weissbrodt and Kruger concede that
there is no consensus on the place of businesses within the international legal order as of
yet that would make possible the Norms’ incorporation into treaties as “hard law,” but
argue that the further refinement and implementation of the Norms by higher bodies in
the United Nations will develop their binding nature. Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note
162, at 913–15. See also Amnesty International, supra note 148, at 6 (“The process leading to the UN Norms is similar to that resulting in other ‘soft law’ standards, some of
which are now seen as part of customary international law.”).
189. Timothy E. Deal, Senior Vice President, U.S. Council for International Business,
Statement to the Fund for Peace, Human Rights and Business Roundtable: Business and
Human Rights; The Proposed Norms on the Responsibilities of Business Regarding Human Rights (Feb. 6, 2004), http://www.uscib.org/index.asp?documentID=2823.
190. See Amnesty International, Statement of Support for the UN Human Rights
Norms for Business delivered at the 60th Session of the Commission on Human Rights
15 March–23 April 2004, Geneva, AI Index: IOR 42/005/2004, http://web.amnesty.
org/pages/ec-unnorms_4-eng (the statement has been signed by nearly 200 NGOs and
175 individuals including members of the European Parliament).
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have criticized the Norms rigorously, principally on the ground that they
shift human rights obligations from governments to private actors.191
Reflecting this tension, the future of the Norms remains uncertain.192
At its session in April 2005, the United Nations Commission for Human
Rights refrained from endorsing the Norms. Instead, it requested that the
Secretary-General appoint a special representative for a period of two
years, with a mandate to clarify further the standards of corporate accountability, and decided to continue consideration of the question at its
next session.193
Under the Norms, transnational corporations have the general obligation to “promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of, and
protect human rights recognized in international as well as national law”
within their spheres of activity and influence.194 This obligation embraces
a standard of “due diligence” that companies’ activities “do not contribute directly or indirectly to human abuses” or “benefit from abuses of
which they were aware or ought to have been aware.”195 In relevant part,
the Norms obligate corporations specifically to “respect economic, social
191. See, e.g., Deal, supra note 189; International Chamber of Commerce [ICC] &
International Organization of Employers [IOC], Joint Views of the ICC and IOE on the
Draft Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business
Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/NGO/44 (July
24, 2003). For a summary of the challenges raised in response to the Norms, see U.N.
Comm’n on Hum. Rts., Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on Human
Rights on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Related Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, para. 20, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2005/91 (Feb. 15,
2005) [hereinafter High Commissioner Report].
192. See Murphy, supra note 168, at 408 (“Initial enthusiasm for the [Norms] . . . has
been muted.”).
193. Human Rights Resolution 2005/69, U.N. Comm’n on Hum. Rts., 61st Sess., U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2005/69 (2005). The Commission’s request was subsequently approved by the Economic and Social Council. Decision 2005/273, U.N. Econ. &
Soc. Council, http://www.un.org/docs/ecosoc/documents/2005/decisions/Decision%20
2005-273.pdf.
194. Norms, supra note 166, para. 1 (noting, also, that states have the primary responsibility of protecting human rights and ensuring their observance by businesses). See also
Ratner, supra note 161, at 508–10 (explaining the “corporate sphere” theory as a set of
concentric circles, where the greatest duty runs to those with most ties to the corporation,
while lesser duties run to those with less ties to the corporation).
195. Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations
and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, para. 1(b), U.N SubComm’n on the Promotion and Protection of Hum. Rts., 55th Sess., U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 (2003) [hereinafter Commentary] (stating that the “due
diligence” standard also encompasses an obligation of corporations to inform themselves
of the human rights impact of their activities so that they can avoid being complicit in
violations).
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and cultural rights . . . and contribute to their realization, in particular the
rights to . . . drinking water,” as well as to “refrain from actions which
obstruct or impede the realization of those rights.”196
The Norms provide for implementation by various entities, ranging
from internal self-regulation by business enterprises to monitoring by
other United Nations bodies, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, investors, lenders and consumers, states,
and so forth.197 In particular, the Norms require businesses to adopt the
provisions of the Norms in internal codes of conduct, disseminate them
to stakeholders and the public, incorporate them into their business contracts, and undertake monitoring and periodic reports.198 As part of their
monitoring obligations, businesses are required to study the human rights
impact of major projects they undertake, within the limits of their resources and capabilities, to make the results available to stakeholders,
and to consider stakeholder reactions.199 Moreover, the Norms require
corporations to engage in periodic assessments of their compliance with
the Norms and to make these assessments available to stakeholders to the
same extent as their annual reports.200 Where assessments show inadequate compliance, the Norms call upon businesses to develop a plan of
action for reparation and redress.201 In addition to actions by the companies, the Norms provide for judicial determination of damages and
criminal sanctions against incompliant companies, in accordance with
national and international law.202
The Norms impose substantive obligations and detailed implementation procedures that go well beyond the general guidelines of prior voluntary models.203 With respect to the right to water, the Norms could
provide an invaluable tool for ensuring that water privatization will not
endanger—and, indeed, that it will contribute to the realization of—the
right to water.

196. Norms, supra note 166, para. 12. As the Commentary explains, this provision
explicitly obligates corporations to “observe standards which protect the right to water
and are otherwise in accordance with [General Comment 15].” Commentary, supra note
195, para. 12(b).
197. For an overview of the implementation procedures envisioned by the Norms, see
Weissbrodt & Kruger, supra note 162, at 915–21.
198. Norms, supra note 166, paras. 15–16; Commentary, supra note 195, paras. 15–16.
199. Commentary, supra note 195, para. 16(i).
200. Id. para 16(g).
201. Id. para 16(h).
202. Norms, supra note 166, para 18.
203. See Amnesty International, supra note 148, at 15.
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V. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
A. Analysis of the Possible Scope of Liability of Private Water Providers
for Violations of the Right to Water and its Enforcement
Reading the provisions of Comment 15 and the Norms on corporate
accountability together, it is possible to examine hypothetically the scope
and nature of corporate responsibility for violations of the human right to
water in the context of privatized water utilities. Maria McFarland
Sánchez-Moreno and Tracy Higgins have argued that privatization
should not constitute a per se violation of the right to water.204 Instead, in
their view, privatization might indeed contribute to the realization of the
right to water.205 Nevertheless, the particular circumstances in which privatization is carried out might give rise to substantive and procedural
violations of the right to water.206
Commenting on the privatization of water in Cochabamba, Bolivia,
Sánchez-Moreno and Higgins have argued that the Bolivian government
might have violated substantive provisions of the right to water, in particular the principles of equity and affordability,207 by approving rate increases without providing for mechanisms to protect its poor residents.208
Furthermore, the failure of the Bolivian government to create timely op-

204. Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1775–76 (describing, but rejecting
the view that privatization might be seen as a per se violation of the human right to water). Drawing on William Finnegan’s article on Cochabamba in The New Yorker, the
authors note that the peasants in Cochabamba viewed the concessionaire as inherently
interfering with their customary habit of using water for free. Id. at 1775. This view was
captured in the expression that the concessionaire attempted to “lease the rain.” Id. See
also Finnegan, supra note 11.
205. Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1776. Cf. Human Rights Resolution 2005/69, supra note 193, pmbl. (recognizing that “the responsible operation of transnational corporations and other business enterprises and effective national legislation can
contribute to the promotion of respect for human rights and assist in channelling the
benefits of business towards this goal . . . .”). But see Kothari, supra note 39 (contending
that privatization erodes the human rights to housing, water, and sanitation).
206. Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1776.
207. Comment 15, supra note 109, paras. 12(c)(ii), 27.
208. Id. para. 44(a)–(b). See Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1776–79.
The authors also observe that the concession arrangements between the Bolivian government and the concessionaire might have interfered with customary uses of water by
Cochabamba peasants, but note that such interference would only give rise to a violation
if carried in an arbitrary manner. Id. at 1779. They argue that arbitrariness may be inferred from the fact that the interference “was merely a byproduct of the deal [between
the government and the consortium] structured to serve other purposes.” Id.
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portunities for citizens to participate in the passing of water laws violates
the procedural rights of participation and information.209
Applying the requirements of Comment 15 and the Norms in this context would extend analogous obligations to a private water provider,
qualified by the limiting standard of “due diligence,” which is expressly
stated in the Norms. Thus, under the standard of “due diligence” a private water provider would be liable for violating the substantive right to
affordable water by designing rate increases without mitigation mechanisms for poor households, to the extent that the company knew or
should have known of the consequences of rate increases on the poorest
residents that it serves.210 Since the Norms also impose an affirmative
duty on companies to inform themselves of the effect of their activities
on human rights, a company that was unaware of the consequences of
rate hikes on the poor residents that it serves would also arguably violate
its duty of due diligence.211
The procedural rights of information and participation by relevant
stakeholders promulgated in Comment 15 as components of the right to
water are supplemented by the implementation procedures of disclosure
and monitoring envisioned by the drafters of the Norms. Under the monitoring obligations of the Norms, a private water provider has an affirmative duty to conduct studies of the human rights impact of proposed privatization contracts. Such duty would compel private water providers to
put their superior institutional resources into designing innovative pricing
solutions, such as differential pricing and subsidies for low-income users
to ensure affordability and access to minimum amounts of water for all.
In addition, since Comment 15 provides for procedural rights to information and participation212 of affected people, water providers would be
required not only to make available the results of human rights studies to
stakeholders, but to consult the local communities affected by their activities. Imposing a relationship of correlative duties and rights between
multinational water providers and sub-sovereign entities, such as affected
communities, could fill in regulatory gaps resulting from weak or corrupt
governments and prevent cooperation with authoritarian ones. The requirements further ensure that corporations will refrain from dealing with
209. Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1781–86.
210. See Commentary, supra note 195, para. 1(b). See also Sánchez-Moreno & Higgins, supra note 12, at 1786–87 (discussing the potential liabilities of the consortium
involved in Cochabamba).
211. See Commentary, supra note 196, para. 1(b).
212. The right to public participation under Comment 15 extends to groups and individuals, over and above the participation by national and local officials. Sánchez-Moreno
& Higgins, supra note 12, at 1782.
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governments behind closed-doors without public input, thereby increasing the transparency of the negotiations between water companies and
governments.
Enforcement of corporate responsibility of the human right to water
may prove difficult. Although a discussion of enforcement strategies and
possible forums is beyond the scope of this Note, it will suffice to point
out two main barriers. First, the passage of time is necessary before the
Norms and Comment 15 mature into “hard law.” In this respect, future
support by the United Nations and the community of states is critical.
Second, although the Norms envision enforcement by international tribunals and national courts,213 there is presently no complaint mechanism
to bring violations of economic, social and cultural rights to the attention
of the ESCR Committee. Nevertheless, violations of the right to water
might be brought before regional human rights forums, where the relevant treaties cover economic, social and cultural rights, provided that
other jurisdictional requirements are satisfied.214 Enforcement by national
courts has been utilized, for example, in South Africa, although it should
be borne in mind that the right to water is enshrined in the South African
Constitution.215 Despite the difficulties of enforcement through litigation,
using the Norms and Comment 15 as a publicity tool may be a powerful
means of bringing international pressure on private water providers to
incorporate human rights provisions in their contracts with governments
and to adopt internal self-regulation policies.
B. The Desirability of a Human Rights Approach to Water Privatization
Considering the degree to which private water operators supplant or
replace public entities in the delivery of water services, especially in developing countries, the elaboration of global mechanisms to protect and
ensure access to water becomes paramount. As commentators on both
sides of the private-public debate have recognized, the global scope of
213. Norms, supra note 166, para. 18.
214. See, e.g., Organization of African Unity, Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples’
Rights art.16(1), June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982) (“Every individual shall have the
right to enjoy the best attainable state of physical and mental health.”).
215. See, e.g., Residents of Bon Vista Mansions v. S. Metro. Local Council 2002 (6)
BCLR 625 (W) (S. Afr.) (holding that plaintiffs’ disconnection from water supply constituted a prima facie violation of their right to water). See also Michael Kidd, Not a Drop
to Drink: Disconnection of Water Services for Non-Payment and the Right of Access to
Water, 20 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 119 (2004), available at http://wwwserver.law.wits.
ac.za/sajhr/2004/kidd.pdf. Where the right to water is not enshrined in a national constitution, the requirement of implementing legislation before treaty obligations become enforceable, especially in dualist countries, may prevent direct enforcement through national courts.
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the water crisis requires global solutions. The exploration of publicprivate partnerships, extolled by international financial institutions, must
go hand-in-hand with developing mechanisms for holding multinational
water companies responsible for the human right to water.
A human rights approach to water privatization is desirable for several
reasons. First, by bringing the scrutiny of the international community to
bear upon the activities of multinational water companies, the human
rights approach alleviates the power inequity between transnational corporations and governments of developing countries. Moreover, a human
rights approach to water privatization would ensure the participation of
the local people as “stakeholders” affected by privatization. Such participation not only protects the interests of affected communities, but also
reduces the political risk for private investors, possibly preempting some
of the privatization fiascos, like the water war in Bolivia.
Second, a human rights approach contributes to the goal of universal
access to water by clarifying that water is “a legal entitlement, rather
than a commodity or service provided on a charitable basis.”216 Imposing
a binding duty for the human right to water on private water providers is
necessary to ensure that the right will not be violated where the host governments are unable or unwilling to regulate.
Nevertheless, some of the objections pertaining to corporate responsibility for human rights in general may attain heightened force in the context of a “welfare” right such as the human right to water. For example,
an objection may be raised that companies should not be forced to assume responsibilities that have traditionally been accorded to states, such
as providing for the welfare of the citizenry.217 Countering such objections, the Norms clearly state that states remain the primary addressees of
human rights law.218 In addition, the Norms limit corporate accountability through the theory of the corporate sphere, ensuring that corporations
are not subjected to a sweeping obligation to the general citizenry.219
Thus, under the Norms, a transnational company that operates in a host
216. THE RIGHT TO WATER, supra note 17, at 9 (also noting that the human rights approach empowers individuals to realize their human rights, rather than seeing them as
“passive recipients of aid”).
217. Indeed, it is still contested whether states have such responsibilities. See supra
Part III.C.
218. Amnesty International, supra note 148, at 14.
219. See High Commissioner Report, supra note 191, para. 36 (“In contrast to the limits on States’ human rights obligations, the boundaries of the human rights responsibilities of business are not easily defined by reference to territorial limits. . . . Defining the
boundaries of business responsibility for human rights therefore requires the consideration of other factors, such as the size of the company, the relationship with its partners,
the nature of its operations, and the proximity of people to its operations.”).
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state, but does not otherwise provide water services, does not—like its
host state—have a general affirmative duty to undertake positive steps
toward the realization of the right to water of the citizens of the host
state. However, a transnational corporation that is engaged in the provision of water services would be bound by an affirmative duty running not
to the general citizenry, but to those water consumers affected by corporate activity. 220
The recent developments regarding the elaboration of a human right to
water and corporate responsibility for human rights may go some way
toward addressing the problems posed by the privatization of a resource
essential to human life, while at the same time preserving the benefits of
privatization. Whether the Norms will develop into “hard law” that
would be binding and enforceable against private water providers remains to be seen.
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220. In this respect, it should be noted that corporate responsibility for the human right
to water is not a panacea to all of the problems attendant to water privatization. For instance, because of the corporate sphere theory, the human rights approach may be of
limited use in addressing the problem of “unbundling” of services central to many privatization schemes, which allows the separation of profitable from unprofitable regions. See
Kothari, supra note 39. By definition, unbundled unprofitable regions which remain in
the public sector would be outside the corporate sphere.
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